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Abstract, Keywords, and Journal of Economic
Literature (JEL) Codes
The housing bubble bust following the emergence of leverage-fuelled property booms
observed in the US culminated in the nancial crisis of 2008-09 did regain the interest
on the vulnerabilities that result from higher levels of leverage. To capture the relation
between leverage and its inuence on asset bubbles, this paper presents a model to repli-
cate an economy with two periods, two dierent assets, with one more risky than the
other, where two states of nature can occur. The heterogeneous beliefs of agents be-
longing to this economy result in dierent assignments on the expected return of the
risky asset which in turn dictates that only the more optimistic agents participate in
the risky asset market. When agents have access to credit to purchase the risky asset,
this participation rate diminishes as a result of the increasing price of the risky asset.
One can also derive from this model that the rate of return of the risky asset depends
positively on the agent’s leverage ratio (or Loan-to-Value (LTV)). By using quarterly
housing data from the European Central Bank (ECB) Data Warehouse, this paper does
a multivariate regression analysis to nd the housing return rate in the Euro area reacts
negatively to increasing households’ leverage observed in the current quarter, but has a
higher positive reaction from the leverage level observed in the previous quarter. The
results suggest the rate of return of the housing market may show some delay to reply
to looser margin requirements.
Keywords: Credit; Leverage; Asset prices; House prices; Asset returns.
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Does Leverage Affect Asset Returns? Theory and Evidence
By Paulo R. Correia
This dissertation intends to present a model based on the leverage cycle the-
ory from Geanakoplos (2010) to capture the relation between debt and asset
prices. The importance of this theory comes from the fact that it gives a very
reasonable explanation for the mechanism that triggered the nancial crisis
of 2008-09. This study also seizes quarterly ECB data to present a multivariate
regression analysis that suggests households’ level of indebtedness has oppo-
site eects on rates of return of the housing market in the Euro depending on
the quarterly lag of the leverage ratio.
1 Introduction
In the last decades, we have seen advanced economies become more and more nan-
cialised, especially since the 1970s. Before that, there was a relatively stable relationship
between bank lending to the non-nancial private sector and the GDP, despite the deep
contraction in bank lending between the Great Depression and World War II. However,
there is an astounding surge of bank credit since the 1960s. In almost 30 years, the aver-
age bank credit-to-GDP ratio in advanced economies almost doubled from 63% in 1980
to 118% in 2009 as Figure 1 shows.1
The main driver of this surge in credit comes mostly from the increase in home-
ownership rates as Jordà et al. (2016) suggest. The home-ownership rates of advanced
economies were around 40% after World War II and then risen, during the past half-
century, to 60% in the 2000s. This was only possible with access to credit that was not
available before. As Figure 2 suggests, mortgage lending accounts for the lion’s share of
the rise of credit-to-GDP ratios in advanced countries since the 1990s. In 2016, the aver-
age mortgage lending already represented more than 65% of the GDP in the 17 advanced
economies considered in Jordà et al. (2017)’s data-set. This fact resulted in the surge of
global house prices that tripled within three decades during the nancial liberalization
period (Knoll et al., 2017).
The fact that the nancial crisis of 2008-09 initiated in the U.S. in 2008-2009 was pre-
ceded by the emergence of leverage-fuelled property booms reminded us that nancial
factors play a crucial role in economic cycles bringing back theory focusing on credit
cycles, which argues that credit build-up leads to economic expansion and credit tight-
ening causes recessions, and if it persists, depressions. The pioneer in this literature was
1This increase should have been even higher since the data excludes the credit creation in the shadow
banking system that has a considerable size in USA as argued in Pozsar et al. (2010).
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Figure 1: Average ratio of total bank lending to GDP
Note: The average ratio of total loans to GDP is calculated using the data provided by
Jordà et al. (2017). This data set covers 17 advanced economies (Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA).
Irving Fisher who argued that over-indebtedness can result in deation in future periods
which in turn can cause the liquidation of collateralised debt. His theory brought nan-
cial intermediation under the spotlight. According to Fisher (1933), the Great Depression
was a result of a vicious cycle where the real burden was increased by the falling prices,
which then led to further deation.
Despite the central role of nance in business cycles assigned by Fisher, there is
some inuential literature that neglects the role of nance on the economy. A case of
that is Modigliani and Miller (1958) who suggest that companies’ economic decisions are
independent of their nancial structure. Other literature that was gaining interest prior
to the last nancial crisis was related to the real business-cycle theory which did not
include nancial frictions in their models (see, for example, Kydland and Prescott, 1982;
Lucas Jr, 1977). However, since the burst of the largest leveraged boom in the history
of the western economies, the notion that nancial factors inuence the real economy
seems to regain interest in macro-economic thinking.
In the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2008-09, we have seen an emergence of
new literature that reserve a central role for nancial intermediation, by introducing
nancial variables in their models based on the general equilibrium theory. An example
of that is the leverage cycle theory from an economist called John Geanakoplos from the
2
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Figure 2: Average ratios of mortgage and non-mortgage lending to GDP
Note: These average ratios are calculated using the data provided by Jordà et al. (2017).
This data set covers 17 advanced economies (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, UK and USA).
University of Yale who provides a model to capture how collateral requirements aect
asset prices and economic activity.
Geanakoplos (2010) argues that long periods of low volatility, such as the Great
Moderation, together with nancial innovation lead to increased leverage and looser
credit standards. These phenomena raise asset prices and increase economic activity, but
makes the economy more vulnerable. When bad news hits the horizon, we witness an
increase in uncertainty that decreases asset valuation and tightens credit requirements.
This tightening works as a feedback loop by further decreasing asset prices as well as
economic activity. To make matters worse, nancial innovation contributes to the emer-
gence of new derivatives as Credit Default Swaps, which further depress prices until they
become too low relative to debts, thus leading to default. According to Geanakoplos, this
amplication eect of asset prices caused by leverage was the main trigger of the 2008
nancial crisis.
The leverage cycle theory contrasts with the mainstream nancial economic theory
that focuses on interest rate behavior. Even if we assume constant interest rates, nancial
intermediation can contribute to increasing demand for assets, and consequently their
prices, by allowing agents to leverage more, i.e., by allowing agents to pay down less
and get their hands on more money to buy a given asset.
To better understand what is leverage, imagine if we buy a durable good, for in-
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stance, a house that costs €100 and we pay down €40 with cash, one can say the margin
requirement on this purchase equals 40%. Knowing the rest of the money used in the
purchase is borrowed money, one can also state the leverage on this purchase, given by
the LTV ratio, is 60%. A few years later, imagine we can buy another house of €100 but
the leverage ratio associated is 90%. Now the buyer only needs €10. This looser margin
requirement should imply a higher demand for houses and then a surge in house prices.
Prior to the crisis of 2008, the US home buyers could get a mortgage loan with only a 3%
margin requirement. This caused house prices to soar (Geanakoplos, 2010).
In the resolution of that crisis, we observed that supervisors begin to be more atten-
tive to purchases on leverage, such that nowadays, the requirements for buying assets
like houses are much more tighter than were before the crises. That fact proves the rel-
evance of regulation on collateral requirements, like limiting LTV and Debt-to-Income
(DTI) ratios, to reduce over-borrowing, and increase nancial stability.
This dissertation intends to simplify the model presented by Geanakoplos in his sev-
eral studies on leverage and assess the inuence of the level of indebtedness on house
prices with help of the ECB data to examine how house return rates in the Euro area re-
act to households’ leverage ratio, which is measured by dividing Euro area households’
outstanding debt to their wealth.
To replicate Geanakoplos’ theory, a baseline model is rst presented in which there
are no debt contracts available. Agents can only buy risk-free or risky assets by selling
the endowment of the asset they don’t want. In the second model, agents already have
access to the credit market by issuing non-contingent promises, that represent loans,
using assets as collateral. The collateral is owned by the borrower but it may be cons-
cated by the lender (more concretely by the court on behalf of the lender) if the borrower
does not deliver his promises. Nevertheless, as we will see further, there is no default in
equilibrium since the collateral requirements will be set high enough to rule out default.
This idea follows the Binomial No-Default Theorem presented by Fostel and Geanako-
plos (2015) who show that equilibrium in an economy with nancial assets serving as
collateral is the same regardless of the possibility of default. What aects the equilib-
rium is the potential default but not the default itself, such that in equilibrium, borrowers
will promise as much as they can while assuring their lenders the collateral is enough
to guarantee delivery. In the case that only non-contingent debt contracts are allowed
in the economy as presented in this paper’s model (as it typically occurs in most of the
loan contracts), agents will end up choosing to trade contracts where the bad outcome
is totally secured by the collateral.
The dissertation is organized as follows: the second section briey revises the exist-
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ing literature about this topic; section 3 introduces the model which captures the asset
price uctuations implied on the rise of leverage; the fourth section presents a multi-
variate regression analysis to assess the relationship between households’ leverage and
housing returns in the Euro area; nally, the conclusion is summed up in section 5.
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2 Literature Review
Despite the subprime crisis being triggered by a leveraged-boom in the American
housing market, there are some economic theories that do not consider nance and debt
as relevant variables. A clear example of that is the inuential Modigliani-Miller Theo-
rem which argues the value of a rm does not depend on the funding source (Modigliani
and Miller, 1958). The theorem defends that, even if all the rm’s assets were nanced
through debt, the value of the rm would be the same as if the capital structure was
solely composed of equity capital. However, it is noteworthy that the MM theorem only
considers this idea valid in a world without taxes. In a world with taxes (the real world),
when the interest on the debt is tax-deductible, the theorem indicates that there is a di-
rectly proportional relationship between the increase in the value of the company and
the amount of debt used.
Another theory that neglects the role of nance is the real-business cycle theory.
In a very short version, this theory envisioned that technological shocks that provoke
random uctuations in the productivity level are what make the constant output growth
trend up or down. In this theory, nance has no role in economic cycles (Kydland and
Prescott, 1982, is one of the most inuential in this theory).
Despite the inuence that these theories continue to have on economic thinking,
there are empirical studies suggesting the growing relevance of debt in advanced economies.
Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Jordà et al. (2016) found that over the second half of
the twentieth century, there has been an unprecedented surge in the ratio of aggregate
private credit to income in advanced economies which calls for the relevance of nance
in economic theory. More recently, Jordà et al. (2017) showed that besides higher lever-
age going hand in hand with less volatility, it implied more severe tail events, meaning
that expansion of private credit seems to be safe for small shocks, but dangerous for
big shocks. In other words, leverage exposed advanced economies to bigger rare-event
crashes, but it helped smooth small disturbances. This article also observed the great
leveraging of the second half of the twentieth century took place primarily in the house-
hold and not in the corporate sector. Before, the same authors already reminded for the
critical role of nance in the economy by showing that what makes a bubble danger-
ous is credit (Jordà et al., 2013, 2015). In a leveraged bubble, a positive feedback loop,
resulting in a growing credit level and asset prices, is developed. The bust of this bub-
ble results in deleveraging which weakens business and household spending, therefore
debilitating economic activity altogether and augmenting macroeconomic risk in credit
markets. In the same way, Mian and Su (2015) support the idea that economic disasters
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like the Great Recession of 2008 are always preceded by growing household debt.
In the wake of the Great Depression of 1929 that shook the world economy, Irving
Fisher developed the debt-deation theory that culminated in the publication of Fisher
(1933). This theory was a pioneer in bringing credit to a central role in economic think-
ing by attributing the crises to the bursting of a credit bubble. In turn, this bubble burst
unleashes a series of negative eects that harm the real economy such as the contrac-
tion of the money supply as bank loans are paid o, the fall in the level of asset prices,
and the reduction in rms’ prots and output. Fisher argued that growing real debt bur-
dens are a result of strong declines in nominal incomes and the price level, which in
turn leads to default. As a result, the aggregate demand is lowered and the price level
declines further, thus leading to a debt-deation spiral. When there is a severe dea-
tion, debtor bankruptcies along with falling asset prices lead to a decline in the nominal
value of assets on bank balance sheets. This will cause the banks to tighten their margin
requirements, which in turn lowers consumption and investment leading to a decline
in the aggregate demand, thereby harming the economy by further contributing to the
deationary spiral.
Following Fisher’s work, Minsky (1986) presented a Financial Instability Hypothesis.
According to this hypothesis, nancial institutions tend to invest more in riskier assets
when there are prolonged periods of prosperity and optimism about future prospects,
which in turn can make the economic system more vulnerable in the case that default
materializes. Later, Keen (1995) modelled Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis.
Bhattacharya et al. (2011) support Minsky’s work by examining the interaction be-
tween the nancial stability and leverage cycle. The paper presents a model that shows
the nancial institutions becoming more optimistic about the future results in increasing
leverage and shifting their portfolios towards riskier projects to pursue higher returns.
Thus, when bad news realises, the consequences for nancial stability are more severe
and the default is higher as a result of this abrupt shift in the nancial institutions’ ex-
pectations.
Still, on nancial frictions, Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012) show that lower con-
sumption volatility and higher consumption growth are generated by higher leverage in
normal times at the expense of endogenous systemic nancial risk. Similarly, Brunner-
meier and Sannikov (2014) present a macro-nancial model that shows how the nan-
cial system becomes less stable by leverage, thereby leading to increasing systemic risks.
Other papers that capture the deationary eects à la Fisher leading to nancial instabil-
ity include Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kyle and Xiong (2001)
and Morris and Shin (2004).
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Following all this inuential literature that I have mentioned so far, which demon-
strates the growing relevance of nancial factors in economic thinking, comes the the-
ory of leverage developed by Geanakoplos on which the model presented in section 3
is based. This theory was a pioneer in the general equilibrium analysis of collateralised
lending to explain an alternative mechanism of how credit aects asset prices and busi-
ness cycles. Firstly, Geanakoplos (1997) showed how incomplete markets lead agents
to leverage as a consequence of the heterogeneous beliefs of economic agents which
creates large price uctuations. Later, Geanakoplos (2003) showed there is a liquidity
crisis when there is bad news about an asset that raises its probability of default. More-
over, the article showed the crisis is amplied by the higher collateral requirements that
come from that increase in the probability of default. The paper further argues these
crises can easily spill over to several markets. Following, Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012)
presented a model that tried to demonstrate the eect of nancial innovation, like lever-
age and tranching (the latter became popular with the appearance of the Collateralised
Debt Obligations (CDO) when the last nancial crisis was brewing), in amplifying the
uctuations in asset prices that resulted in the subprime crisis. Fostel and Geanakoplos
(2016) proved that a collateral constrained agent, who is given the opportunity to bor-
row money without posting collateral, will never go for investment projects (the ones
that usually demands collateral) and instead spend the money on consumption.
Summing up, one can say the model of collateral equilibrium developed by the economist
John Geanakoplos, started in Geanakoplos (1997, 2003), showed how heterogeneous be-
liefs of economic agents lead to leverage which in turn raise asset prices. Then, Geanako-
plos (2010) introduced short-selling in the same kind of model to replicate the appearance
of Credit Default Swap (CDS), which lowers the asset prices and amplies economic re-
cessions. Afterward, Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) developed a more general model
that showed how dierent kinds of nancial innovations like leverage, tranching, and
CDS can have big eects on prices. Finally, Fostel and Geanakoplos (2016) introduced
investment in the model to show that investment is also aected by nancial innovation.
Similarly to Geanakoplos (2003), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) set a exible-price
endowment model in which "impatient" agents borrow from "patient" agents subject to
a debt limit. If there is a shock that reduces the debt constraint, a vicious deleveraging
spiral is initiated as a result of agents forced to cut spending. In the same way, Simsek
(2013) presents a model in which traders borrow by selling collateralised contracts to
lenders who do not share the same beliefs. However, since collateral is not as much
valued by the pessimists as compared to optimists, they are reluctant to lend, which
puts an endogenous constraint on the ability of the optimists to borrow and to inuence
the prices of asset. Previously, Reinhart and Rogo (2008) had already identied that
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a potential cause for the increase in asset prices leading to the housing and mortgage
crisis was the optimism of a fraction of investors. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen (2009) are other papers that present some more insights on the
interaction between the borrowing capacity of agents and the pricing of assets.
It is also noteworthy the Geanakoplos’ literature on leverage contrasts with the sev-
eral articles that focus their models on asymmetric information to show how the collat-
eral ratio is determined in equilibrium. For example, based on the strong informational
asymmetries, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) modelled a collateral-driven credit constraint,
whereby fully collateralised loans can only be obtained by the rm if the value of the
assets of the rm is greater than the value of the loan. In this paper, deationary pres-
sures on the prices of the rm’s assets shrink the available amount of credit for the rm.
Subsequently, Bernanke and Gertler (1990) developed a model of the process of invest-
ment nance in which there is asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers
about the borrower’s eort and about the quality of investment projects, such that the
number of projects initiated depends on the balance sheets of the borrower. In the case
of weak balance sheets, the economy experiences misallocation of investment resources
or underinvestment. Townsend (1979), Myers and Majluf (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985)
and Hart and Moore (1994) are other works that focus on asymmetric information as the
main friction in the credit markets.
In the next section, a simpler version of the collateral equilibrium model has been
introduced.
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3 A Simple Model
As already mentioned, Geanakoplos (1997, 2003, 2010) and Fostel and Geanakoplos
(2012, 2015, 2016) describe a model of collateral equilibrium. The basic idea is the follow-
ing: In the nancial market, two types of agents participate, optimists (or investors) and
pessimists (general public). Optimists invest in the risky asset M and pessimists invest
in the risk-free asset F . If those agents have access to credit, not only assets are traded
but also debt contracts in such a way that optimists sell promises to pessimists, which
means that optimists become borrowers and pessimists become lenders.
In equilibrium, four variables are determined: the number of assets each type of
agent chooses to hold, the price of the risky asset, the quantity of promises each type
of agent chooses to sell/buy, and the price of the promise which is equivalent to the
underlying amount of each loan (evidently the latter two are only determined in the
case with borrowing).
To simplify, this model only considers nancial assets as equity stocks, which is an
asset that does not give direct utility to their holders and pays the same dividends no
matter who owns it. We will also assume this type of asset not carrying asymmetric
information problems like a moral hazard or adverse selection. We will consider that
the borrower has no control or specialized knowledge of the cash ows provided by the
collateral.
3.1 Baseline Model
To introduce, a two-period model is presented in which borrowing is not allowed.
This model is based on the one produced in section II.A of Geanakoplos (2010), though
dierent notation has been used along with some simplication.
Figure 3 presents a binomial information tree with the two states that can occur in the
second period, U andD. The good state is assumed to have as probability πU (represents
the probability of good news) and the bad state πD = 1− πU (probability of bad news).
These probabilities are subjective.
Agents in this economy are indexed by a in a continuum between 0 and 1, a ∈ [0, 1]
ranked from more pessimistic to more optimistic as shown in Figure 4, which means that
agent’s beliefs are heterogeneous. This type of distribution of agents represented by a
continuum allows dierent assignments to the probabilities of the states of nature for
each agent a, depending on their optimism. Nevertheless, these agents are assumed to
be risk-neutral and characterized by a linear utility function for consumption such that
10
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Figure 3: Binomial Information Tree
the von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility of agent a is





Agents of this economy get no utility from holding the assets F and M and there
is only one consumption good with price equal to one, for simplicity, which is only
consumed in the future, at time t = 1. This consumption good is obtained out of the
nancial income depending on the holdings of agent a.
The model also assumes that agents are not impatient (i.e., they have a discount
factor equal to 1). Agents are homogeneous in the other dimensions, including in their
initial distribution of wealth, which means the initial endowments of assets F and M
are equal for every agent a ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, in the current period, at time t = 0, agent a
has an endowment of the two assets, a risk-free asset F and a risky asset M , with asset
prices at time t = 0 and payos at time t = 1 denoted respectively by






or equivalently the asset returns
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Figure 4: Continuum of Agents
We can think of the risk-free asset F as money or a term deposit, andM as an equity
stock that may have a higher or a lower value in the future depending on the state that
occurs.
Given asset prices and potential payos, each agent a chooses asset holdings f of F
andm ofM at time t = 0 and the consumption plan for time t = 1 in order to maximize
its utility function (1), subject to the following sequence of budget constraints:
Ba(p) = {(f,m, cU , cD) ∈ R4+ :
(f − eF ) + p(m− eM) = 0,
cs = fv
F +mvMs , s = U,D}
3.1.1 General equilibrium









• agents solve their problems, i.e. (fa,ma, caU , caD) ∈ argmax{Ua(cU , cD) : (f,m, cU , cD) ∈
Ba(p)} for every a ∈ [0, 1]
• asset markets clear to guarantee the supply of assets F and M equals its demand
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in this economy such that ∫ 1
0
fada = eF (2)∫ 1
0
mada = eM (3)
3.1.2 General public, investors and the neutral buyer
Solving the agent problem described above2, we get that
• Agent a is a member of the "general public" (those who are pessimists and only











which means that according to the probability they assign to each state of nature,
the general public believes the return of the risk-less asset is higher than the return
of the risky asset.











which means an investor believes that the return of the risky asset is higher than
the return of the risk-less asset.
• Agent a is the neutral buyer n ∈ (0, 1) that is indierent between investing in the
risk-less and the risky asset because he/she believes the return of both assets are












where πns for s = U,D are the probabilities associated with the neutral buyer.
Note the previous conditions make sense since the members of the general public
attribute a lower probability to the state U than an investor does when it is this good
state that provides a bigger payo from holding the risky asset.
2You can see how to solve it in Appendix A.1.
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3.1.3 Equilibrium conditions
Because agents are distributed in the domain [0, 1] and we know the arbitrage condi-
tion of the "frontier agent", we have to split the interval in some way. If we assume that
"investors" assign a higher probability to the good state, we need to separate the popu-
lation in the following way: if a ∈ [0, n), then a is a member of the "general public"; if
a ∈ (n, 1], he is an "investor".
Consequently, using this distribution of the population and the budget constraints,
one can write the demand of agent a for the assets
fa =
eF + peM , a ∈ [0, n)0, a ∈ (n, 1] (7)
ma =

0, a ∈ [0, n)
eF + peM
p
, a ∈ (n, 1]
(8)
Then, if we run the asset market clearing conditions (2) and (3), we obtain the equilibrium












Now we know the equilibrium price of M depends positively on the participation
rate in the risky asset market given by 1 − n. The variable n which is determined en-
dogenously, gives the population share of the general public, meaning that the lower the
share of pessimists in this economy, the higher the price of the risky asset. Note that
in equilibrium, the price of the risky asset equals the amount of risk-free assets sold by
investors divided by the amount of risky assets they bought from the general public.
Now, one can write the expressions for the equilibrium in asset holdings and con-





, a ∈ [0, n)
0, a ∈ (n, 1]
(10)
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ma =

0, a ∈ [0, n)
eM
1− n







, a ∈ [0, n)
eMvMs
1− n
, a ∈ (n, 1], s = U,D
(12)
Observe that all future consumption is derived from asset payos and it is state-independent
for the "general public" while it is state-dependent for the "investors".
3.1.4 The endogenous participation rate
The equilibrium values for p, f and m depend on the endogenous split of the popu-
lation n, or endogenous participation in the asset markets.
In order to be able to determine n, the idiosyncratic probabilities of agents are as-
sumed to be a function of a, i.e., πas = πs(a), for s = U,D, such that the probability of
good news (good state) for neutral buyer n is πnU = n and the probability of bad news is
πnD = 1− n, as it is presented in Geanakoplos (2010).3
Using this assumption and substituting the equilibrium asset price (9) in equation
(6), we get the equilibrium population split
n∗ = n(ε, δU , δD) = −
ε+ δD −
√
(δD − ε)2 + 4 ε δU
2 (δU − δD)
(13)
with δ being the risk premium in multiplicative form








where δU > δD.
Note that besides giving the equilibrium neutral buyer, n∗ also gives us the equilib-
rium percentage of pessimists in this economy, as 1 − n∗ gives the equilibrium partici-
pation rate in the risky asset market. This equilibrium participation rate is a function of
the risk premium and relative supply of assets.
3In Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012), it is assumed that πU (a) = 1 − (1 − a)2, whereas Fostel et al.
(2017) assumes that πU (a) = aζ with ζ < 1 where ζ determines the relative proportion of optimists vs
pessimists.
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To analyse the relationship between the participation rate and their explanatory vari-
ables, partial derivatives of n were taken with respect to those variables.
• ∂n
∂δU
< 0, meaning the bigger the risk premium when the good state occurs, the




< 0, which means that an increase in the risk premium for the bad state
also results in an increase of the share of optimistic agents in the economy. Thus,
regardless of the state of nature that occurs, one can conclude there is always
higher participation in the risky asset market as risk premium increases.
• ∂n
∂ε
> 0, showing that when the supply of risk-free assets increases relatively to the
supply of risky assets, the participation rate in the risky asset market diminishes,
and we tend to have more pessimists to hold these risk-less assets.
3.1.5 Numerical Example
Table I: Exogenous variables
e vU vD
F 1 0.5 0.5
M 1 1 0.2
Now, the numerical example presented in Table I will be used for the exogenous
variables eF , eM , δF and δMs for s = U,D
From this data and using equation (13), we get n ≈ 0.466, meaning that investors,
i.e. every agent a > 0.466, will sell all their endowment of the risk-free asset F to buy
all they can of risky asset M and the bottom 53.4% will demand the risk-free assets the
top 46.6% are selling. Then substituting this value in equation (9), we get the equilibrium
price for the risky asset p ≈ 1.146. Finally, the equilibrium distribution of asset holdings
and consumption can be obtained from equations (10), (11) and (12).
Table II: Equilibrium portfolios and consumption for an economy with no access to
credit
f m cU cD
a ∈ [0, n) 2.146 0 1.073 1.073
a ∈ (n, 1] 0 1.873 1.873 0.375
Further, these results will be compared with the results given by the model where
there is access to the credit market.
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3.2 A Model with access to the Credit Market
This section presents a model with similar features than the previous one, that is,
replicating an economy with two periods, two dierent assets, with one more risky than
the other, where two states of nature can occur and agents are risk-neutral and have
heterogeneous beliefs, being homogeneous in the other dimensions. The only dierence
is that in this economy, borrowing is allowed to give the most optimistic agents a chance
to spend more on the risky asset. This will push up the price ofM as we will see further.
To introduce borrowing,the agent a is supposed to only make non-contingent promises
backed by the asset M such that each debt contract d uses one unit of asset M and
promises (ds, vMs ) units of consumption, whatever it is the state of nature that occurs.
In other words, we dene a debt contract as an ordered pair consisting of a promise and
the collateral backing it.
The price of contract d is given by θd and it is determined in the rst period, meaning
that agent a can borrow θd today by selling the debt contract d promising d tomorrow.
To enforce the repayment of a loan, the investor uses asset M as the collateral so
that if he defaults, the asset can be seized. Typically, default happens when the collateral
worth less than the promise. However, since we assume loans are non-recourse, the
maximum borrowers can lose is their collateral if they do not honor their promise, even
if the value of the collateral is lower than the promise.
Now let ψa be the number of contracts d traded by an agent a at time t = 0. A
positive ψa indicates agent a is selling contracts d and borrowing ψaθd. A negative
ψa indicates agent a is buying contracts d, that means, he/she is lending |ψa| θd. The
agent who sells promises invests in the risky asset and oers the payo min{ds, vMs } to
the lender, where, given the loans being non-contingent, we assume the contracted d is
state-independent such that dU = dD = d.
Given the asset and debt contract prices (p, θd), each agent a ∈ (0, 1) chooses risk-
free and risky assets holdings, (f,m), and debt contract trades, ψa, at t = 0, and con-
sumption, cs, in each state s, at t = 1 to maximize utility function (1) subject to the
budget set given by
Ba(p, θ) =
{
(f,m, cU , cD, ψ) ∈ R4+ × R :
(f − eF ) + p (m− eM) = θ ψ ,
max{0, ψ} ≤ m ,
cs = f v
F +mvMs −min{ds, vMs }ψ, s = U,D
}
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Now the budget constraint allows asset holdings chosen by agent a at t = 0 to go beyond
the revenue from his initial endowment by buying/selling debt contracts. Nevertheless,
the number of debt contracts available to be sold by agent a is limited to the number
of assets M he chooses to hold, such that agent a can not sell more promises than his
holdings of asset M that he can use as collateral. The last constraint shows what will be
the consumption level after the agent a has paid (in the case of agent a being an investor)
or has received (agent a being a member of the general public) the value promised as it
was settled in the debt contract.
In the upcoming section, the introduction of credit in form of promises will allow
optimistic agents to buy all the risky assets M by leveraging their purchases selling the
debt contract d, at price θ, using the assetM as collateral. In doing so, it is like optimists
are buying the Arrow security that pays in the U state (since at D, their net payo after
debt repayment is 0).4
3.2.1 General equilibrium








such that agents solve their problems, i.e. (fa,ma, ψa, caU , caD) ∈ argmax{Ua(cU , cD) :
(f,m, ψ, cU , cD) ∈ Ba(p, θ)} for every a ∈ [0, 1] and asset markets clear, but now the
market for promises also clears ∫ 1
0
ψada = 0 (14)
This new market-clearing condition ensures that for each borrower i who sells a deter-
mined promise, there is a lender g who wants to buy it.
Since the loans are assumed as non-contingent, which implies that promises are
state-independent such that dU = dD = d, in order to get an equilibrium, it makes
sense to assume that a contract between the public and an investor can only be drawn if
Eg[min{d, vM}] = Ei[min{d, vM}]
This expression ensures that in equilibrium, the expected outcome from the promise
contracted between an investor and the public is the same. By assuming this, we get
that there is only equilibrium in the promises market if the payo of the promise equals
the collateral value if the worst scenario occurs, i.e., if d equals vMD . Hence, we can
already state that in equilibrium, the collateral requirements will be set high enough to
4Geanakoplos (2010) and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) also show how agents can short-selling the
assetM and eectively buy Arrow D security. These articles introduce a CDS on assetM that is a contract
that promises to pay 0 when M pays vMU and promises vMU − vMD when M pays vMD .
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rule out default.5
3.2.2 General public, investors, and the neutral agent
Again, solving the agent problem, we get some results similar to the model without
borrowing.6 The general public still believes the return of asset F is higher than the
expected return of asset M , as equation (4) shows, while investors think otherwise, as
shown by equation (5) in the previous model. The neutral agent continues to be indier-
ent between investing in the risk-less and the risky asset because he believes the return
of both assets are equivalent. Again this happens because the members of the general
public attribute a lower probability to the state U than an investor does when it is this
good state that provides a bigger payo from holding the risky asset.
3.2.3 Equilibrium conditions
Now the demand of agent a for the risk-free asset and the risky asset become
fa =
eF + peM + θψa, a ∈ [0, b)0, a ∈ (n, 1] (15)
ma =

0, a ∈ [0, n)
eF + peM + θψa
p
, a ∈ (n, 1]
(16)
In equilibrium, the investor a ∈ (n, 1] chooses to borrow as much as he can such that
the number of promises ψa equals his holdings of the risky asset ma. This only holds
when the investor expects that the return of the risky asset M will be higher than the
return of the promises he sold to the general public. Hence, the equilibrium number of





eF + p eM
p− θ∗
, a ∈ [0, n)
eF + p eM
p− θ∗
, a ∈ (n, 1]
(17)
5It follows Geanakoplos (2003) which conrms the only debt contract traded in equilibrium is d∗ = vMD .
6You can see how to solve it in Appendix A.2.
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is the equilibrium price of promise d∗ which gives the value borrowed by investors to
buy each risky asset he chose to hold.
From the previous expression, it can be veried that the higher the price of the risky
asset, the lower the number of promises each investor chooses to sell since there will
be fewer agents able to buy risky assets. It can also be stated that the equilibrium price
of a promise has a positive eect on the number of promises sold by investors since a
higher θ∗ provides more money to investors from selling promises such that it is likely
they supply more of those promises.
Again, if one runs the asset and promises markets clearing conditions (2), (3) and (14)
one obtains the equilibrium price of the risky asset M in an economy where borrowing








which is analog to equation (9) in the previous model. Note that again the equilibrium
price of the risky asset equals the amount of money investors can get by selling their
risk-free assets and by borrowing, divided by the amount of risky assets they can buy.
Through the market-clearing conditions, we get the same expressions for the equi-
librium asset holdings as presented in equations (10) and (11) in the model without bor-











, a ∈ (n, 1], s = U,D
(19)
Whereas the public’s consumption plan is aected positively by the payo in the bad
state got from the risky asset M (remember that d = vMD in equilibrium to meet the
expectations of investors and the public regarding making contracts on loans), the in-
vestors’ consumption plan is aected negatively by vMD since it’s the value of the repay-
ment from their loans. Yet, if the bad state occurs, investors will not consume anything at
t = 1, and the consumption plan for the general public is still state independent besides
the introduction of borrowing.
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3.2.4 The endogenous participation rate
Again, since the probability of good news (good state) for neutral buyer n is πnU = n
and the probability of bad news is πnD = 1 − n, one can determine n∗ substituting the
equilibrium asset price (18) in equation (6) as follows:
n∗ = n(ε, δU , δD) = −
ε+ δD −
√
(δD + ε) (4δU − 3δD + ε)
2 (δU − δD)
(20)
The relation of the agents’ participation rate in the risky assets’ market regarding
their explanatory variables is the same as presented in the model without borrowing,
except for δD, such that an increase in the risk premium for the bad state results in an
increase of the percentage of pessimistic agents in the economy (those who do not want
to participate in the risky asset market). This result makes sense since the consumption
plan for the general public now depends positively on the outcome of the contract they
bought, which in turn depends on the payo of the risky asset in the bad state vMD which
is the collateral value they receive in case of default.
3.2.5 Numerical Example
Now, the same numerical example as in Table I will be used for the exogenous vari-
ables eF , eM , vF and vMs for s = U,D.
From this data and using equation (20), we getn ≈ 0.595, meaning the general public,
i.e., every agent a < 0.595, will sell all their endowment of the risky asset and the top
40.5% (investors) will buy as many risky assets as they can by selling their endowment
of risk-free assets and borrowing what they can from the bottom 59.5% (general public).
Then substituting this value in equation (18), we get the equilibrium price for the risky
asset p ≈ 1.352. Finally, we can obtain the equilibrium distribution of asset holdings,
the number of promises and consumption, from equations (10), (11), (17) and (19).
Table III: Equilibrium portfolios, number of promises and consumption for an economy
with access to credit
f m ψ cU cD
a ∈ [0, n) 1.681 0 −1.681 1.176 1.176
a ∈ (n, 1] 0 2.469 2.469 1.975 0
Comparing these results to the ones presented in Table II where there is no access to
credit, we observe the price of the risky asset is higher in the economy with borrowing
since there is a higher demand for the risky asset and agents choose to hold more of
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this type of asset. However, the participation rate on the risky asset market diminishes
when borrowing is introduced, which means that only the more optimistic agents accept
to hold the risky asset at a higher price. Yet the consumption level of the general public
increases with the introduction of leverage since these agents are also lenders and they
are paid back in the second period when it’s time for their consumption. Investors also
consume more when the good state occurs. However, if it does not occur, investors have
nothing to consume unlike what happens in the economy without borrowing available.
3.2.6 Leverage, bad news and risky asset returns
Since we know the equilibrium price of the promise is 0.4, we can also get the lever-
age ratio, given by the LTV, by dividing the amount borrowed by the value of the asset
used as collateral. So, in equilibrium, every debt contract d has an associated leveraged
of 0.30 which means an investor i can resort to credit to purchase one assetM but needs
to use 70% in cash.7
In order to relate the agent’s leverage ratio to asset returns, one can derive the equi-
librium risky asset return as follows
RM = leveraged
n vMU + (1− n) vMD
δD
(21)
Using the numerical example, we get RM = 0.5, which is similar to the risky asset
return in the economy without credit. The equation 21 now allows to state that the risky
asset return depends positively on the agent’s leverage ratio.
Remembering that in the beginning, the idiosyncratic probabilities of agents were
assumed to be a function of a such that the probability of stateD for the neutral agent n
is given by 1− n, it can now be stated that the higher the probability of a bad outcome,
the higher become the margin requirements (this is similar to stating that the lower the
πnU = n, the lower the leverage ratio). This idea follows Geanakoplos (2003) which shows
there is a liquidity crisis when there is bad news about an asset that raises its probability
of default, but the crisis is amplied by the higher collateral requirements that come from
that increase in the probability of default. That’s why the margin requirements on debt
contracts are so relevant to understand the dynamics between nance and economics.
Next, a multivariate regression analysis is presented to nd how the housing return
7The leverage ratio associated to the debt contract d is obtained by dividing the debt contract by the
price of its collateral, such that leveraged =
θd
p
. Similarly, the margin requirement associated to debt
contract d is given by 1 - leveraged.
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rate reacts to the households’ leverage ratio in the Euro area.
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4 Statistical Evidence
To validate the presented theory arguing that looser margin requirements imply
higher demand for houses and then a surge in housing prices and returns, a multivariate
regression analysis is performed to assess the relevance of leverage ratio on the housing
market. This analysis also contemplates interest rates to determine if the conventional
idea that diminishing interest rates boosts housing prices is veried.
4.1 Methodology
4.1.1 Data Sample
The study is solely based on the Euro area, the data for the study has been adopted
from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. The data is secondary in nature and dis-
tributed on a cross-section of variables and time series. The data spans from the sec-
ond quarter of 2003 (2003-Q2) to the 1st quarter of 2020 (2020-Q1). The sample size for
each variable is 68 (n=68). The dataset under analysis is both nancial and non-nancial
for the variables including: households’ housing wealth, current prices - domestic cur-
rency (millions); loans granted to households, current prices - domestic currency (mil-
lions); residential property prices index (2015=100); GDP at market prices deator index
(2015=100); and bank interest rates charged for loans to households for house purchase
with an original maturity of over ve years (%). The original data extracted from the
ECB Statistical Data Data Warehouse is presented in Table V, Appendix B.
4.1.2 Variables
Following the theory established in the literature and the research question under
study, the following variables have been used:
• Loans Granted to Households (debt): The variable loans granted to households
represent the loans granted in the Euro area to households and non-prot institu-
tions serving households.
• Households’ Housing Wealth (collateral): The variable housing wealth rep-
resents the estimated wealth of households and non-prot institutions serving
households in the Euro area and accounts for the collateral held by households.
• Residential Property Prices (prices): The variable residential prices serve as
a proxy for accounting risky asset prices used in the model presented in section
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: Leverage ratio, residential property prices and GDP index
3. For the purpose, the residential property price index has been adopted for all
dwelling types, new and existing.
• GDPDeator Index (gdp): This GDP variable accounts for the economic activity
including domestic (home or reference area) and is measured as a deator index.
The sample used refers to non-transformed data, neither seasonally adjusted nor
calendar adjusted.
• Interest Rate (interest): The variable interest rate accounts for bank interest
rates on loans to households for house purchases with an original maturity of
over ve years (outstanding amounts) in the Euro area.
• Leverage ratio (leverage): The variable leverage ratio used is similar to the LTV
ratio. The households’ leverage ratio for the Euro area has been computed by






Figure 5 provides some insights into the evolution of households’ leverage ratio,
house prices and GDP during the last two decades. One can argue that while the time
series of house prices and GDP show a clear growth trend, the same does not apply to
the leverage ratio.
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4.1.3 Rates of Return
In order to nd the best regression possible and have a variable that ts equation 21
presented at the end of section 3, the rate of return of housing has been computed as





Yet, in an attempt to remove the eects that may explain the trend shown in Figure
5a, the housing detrended return rate has been computed by subtracting the GDP growth
rate from equation 23. Thus, for testing the proposed model, the dependent variable of
housing detrended return rate has been computed from equation 24, as follows:





Following equation 24, the present study adopts a multivariate regression approach
to explain the proposed eects as established in section 3. To do this, the main concern
is about the direction and the signicance of the relationship between the leverage ratio
in the period t, t − 1 and t − 2, and the rate of return on housing. The regression used
to assess this relationship is presented in equation 25.













+ β4 (interestt,i) + εt,i
(25)
Further, to assess the model tness, the R-square measure of goodness of t and
analyses of variance for overall model t were accounted for.
4.2 Regression Model Results
4.2.1 Model Assessment
Table IV shows the results for the proposed relationships and model tness. The re-
sults suggest the model presented in equation 25 is signicant at the levels of signicance
of 1% and 5%, except for the independent variable referring to interest rates (variable in-
troduced as a bonus, as it does not appear in the model presented in the previous section).
Further, the R-square for the model is 0.55, suggesting that the independent variables,
including leverage ratio for the current quarter and the previous two and interest rates,
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Table IV: Regression Model Results
explain a 55% variation in the housing return rate. Both the level of signicance and
the R square measure presented suggest that equation 25 provides a reasonable t for
explaining the proposed relationships.
4.2.2 Relationships Estimation
The results shown in Table IV suggest there is a signicant negative eect of the
leverage ratio on the housing return rate (β1 = −8.570, p-value < 0.01). This re-
sult does not support the proposed eect. However, one can derive new conclusions
from the lagged leverage ratio independent variables, since the results show an even
stronger relationship between leverage ratio in the previous quarter and the housing
return. As Table IV shows, there is evidence of a robust and signicant positive eect
of the leverage ratio at t − 1 (β2 = 10.637, p-value < 0.01). Nevertheless, the same
results also show a signicant negative eect of the leverage ratio at t− 2, although the
impact of this latter independent variable, leveraget−2, is weaker than the previous ones
(β3 = −2.477, p-value < 0.05).
Further, Table IV indicates a slight and insignicant negative eect of interest rates
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on housing returns (β4 = −0.000363, p-value > 0.05).
4.2.3 Some Intuition
These results may suggest there is a delayed eect of the level of households’ indebt-
edness in the housing return rate. This can mean that the rate of return of the housing
market has a higher positive reaction from margin requirements observed at t−1 than at
the current period, which means that the market needs some time to react to the increas-
ing leverage level. Even so, the fact that the independent variable lagged in two periods
also has signicant negative eects on the housing market may call into question this
theory.
Regarding interest rates, these results are in line with the literature that argues that
collateral requirements may have a bigger impact on prices than current interest rates,
although the eect of interest rates may as well be somewhat delayed.8
8The relationship between interest rates and the rates of return of houses has not been deepened since
this is not the central point of the dissertation.
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5 Conclusion
This dissertation intended to simplify the leverage cycle theory presented by Geanako-
plos (2010) and conrm what is common sense for an economist. Credit is a fundamental
piece on the denition of prices because of its role in the demand for assets. To do so, a
two-period model is rstly presented to replicate a binomial economy where there are
two dierent assets, a risk-less and a risky asset, where the last can have dierent pay-
os depending on the state of nature s = U,D that occurs. In the baseline model, there
is no access to debt in such a way that agents need to sell the assets they do not want
in order to buy what they want according to their expectations on the return of those
assets. Then, credit in the same model was introduced to prove that debt results in the
rise of the risky price asset. By introducing debt, the risky asset returns turns out to
depend positively from agents’ leverage ratio, which is measured by LTV.
To study this relationship between risky asset returns and agents’ collateral rates,
a multivariate regression analysis has been performed to assess the relevance of lever-
age ratio on the housing market. By using quarterly housing data from the ECB Data
Warehouse, this paper found that, between 2003 and 2020, housing return rates in the
Euro area reacted negatively to increasing households’ leverage observed in the current
quarter, but showed a higher positive reaction from the leverage level observed in the
previous quarter. The results suggest the rate of return of the housing market may show
some delay to reply to looser margin requirements. Even so, the fact that the house-
holds’ leverage ratio lagging in two quarters also shows signicant negative eects on
the housing market may call into question this theory.
This empirical analysis did leave room for more advanced econometric analyses if
one can collect microdata from commercial banks to assess what were the historical
LTV’s at which nancial intermediaries lent to households. Future research can still
target the study on the housing market to appraise the evolution of the collateral re-
quirements before and after the bust of the subprime crisis and check the behavior of
house prices and economic growth.
The relevance of the leverage cycle theory comes from the fact that it gives a very
reasonable explanation for the mechanism that triggered the nancial crisis of 2008-
09. This theory shows how a long period of relatively stable economic performance,
as the Great Moderation, together with nancial innovation, prompted excessive debt
and looser credit standards demanded by credit institutions. These tendencies raised
house prices and increased economic activity but made the economy more vulnerable
to negative shocks. When bad news arrived, an abrupt turnaround in house prices and
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a tightening of collateral rates demanded by lenders was observed. This tightening cre-
ated a feedback eect which further decreased housing prices and spilled over these
deationary pressures to other markets harming economic activity.
Regarding the model presented in this paper, an interesting further investigation
could be to nd the dynamics introduced with a model with more than two periods and
nd if the returns of investors increase over time when the price of the risky asset, used
as collateral, decreases such that optimistic agents try to seize the opportunity to buy
more of those assets, expecting its price will grow in the future. It should be possible to
link this type of model to a social welfare model where the inequalities would increase as
the leverage requirements varies because of the stronger ability of investors to hold risky
and more valuable assets (mainly in the long-run). In a model with more periods of time,
an increase in the uncertainty of the future value of the risky asset can also be observed,
since in each period of time, there is more than one state of nature, which should result in
more volatility in the asset market and thereby higher margin requirements by lenders.
Another possibility for future investigation on the presented model is to consider
more than two states of nature where defaults are not ruling out and agents can choose
to trade a contract where the bad outcome is not totally secured by the collateral. In this
model, equilibrium should adjust to a lower price of loans to compensate lenders for the
higher expected loss from default.
Finally, one could introduce short-selling in the model by simplifying what is pre-
sented in Geanakoplos (2010) and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012), and see its eect on
asset prices (it is expected to decrease the prices).
To conclude, this dissertation showed that there is another variable dierent than
interest rates that has a crucial role in assessing the ability of an economic agent to
borrow, which is the collateral rate required in a given debt contract. This variable is
specically relevant given the looser credit conditions provided by credit institutions
prior to the subprime crisis.
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A Appendix
A.1 Solution to the baseline model
A.1.1 Solving the agent’s problem
We assume that the solution for cas is interior. In this case, the Lagrangean for any
agent a ∈ [0, 1] is
La = πaUcU+πaDcD+λa0
(







fvF +mvMs − cs
)
+ηF,af+ηM,am
The rst-order optimality conditions become
λas = π
a


















0 = (fa − eF ) + p(ma − eM) (26)
cas = f
avF +mavMs , s = U,D (27)
and complementarity slackness equations are
ηF,afa = 0, ηF,a ≥ 0, fa ≥ 0 (28)
ηM,ama = 0, ηM,a ≥ 0, ma ≥ 0 (29)
Using the fact that πaU + πaD = 1, then the optimality conditions are
λa0 = v











From those conditions, we can split agents into two groups: agents that buy the risk-
free asset and sell their initial endowment of the risky asset (group g) and agents that
buy the risky asset and sell their initial endowment of the risk-free asset (group n).
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A.1.2 General Public
A representative member of the "general public" sells its endowment of the risky
asset and buy the risk-free asset, such that
f g > 0, ηF,g = 0
and
mg = 0, ηM,g > 0.
Then
λg0 = v








D = Eg[vM ]
implying that equations (30) and (31) become
pvF > Eg[vM ] (32)
From equations (26) and (27), we obtain their demand for the risk-free asset
f g = eF + peM
and consumption, which is state-independent
cgs = f
gvF , s = U,D.
A.1.3 Investors
"Investors" sell their endowment of the risk-free asset such that it is optimal for them
to give a zero position on the risk-free asset implying
f i = 0, ηF,i > 0
and
f i > 0, ηM,i = 0
Then equation (30) and (31) become
λi0 > v








D = Ei[vM ]
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which is equivalent to saying that for the investor we have
pvF < Ei[vM ] (33)




and consumption, which is state-dependent
cis = m
ivMs , s = U,D.
A.1.4 The neutral buyer
Considering the two conditions, (32) and (33), and by continuity, this means that
there is a neutral agent with index a = n ∈ (0, 1) that is indierent between investing







D = En[vM ] (34)
where πns for s = U,D are the probabilities associated with the neutral buyer.
A.1.5 Equilibrium price of the risky asset
Knowing the demand of agent a for the assets is given by (7) and (8), if we run the














By Walras’s Law, one of these conditions is redundant. Thus we get the equilibrium













A.1.6 Equilibrium participation rate
In order to be able to determine n, it is assumed that πas = πs(a), for s = U,D,
meaning the idiosyncratic probabilities of agents are function of a.
Using this assumption and substituting the equilibrium asset price (9) in equation
(34), then n is determined endogenously from
n∗ = {n ∈ (0, 1) : (1− n)ε = n (πnU(n)δU + πnD(n)δD)} (35)
with δ being the risk premium in the multiplicative form








where δU > δD. Indeed, n is a xed point of equation (35).
Assuming πnU = n and πnD = 1 − n as the form of the probabilities, we can solve
equation (35) for n ∈ (0, 1) and get the equilibrium population split as presented in
equation (13):
n∗ = n(ε, δU , δD) = −
ε+ δD −
√
(δD − ε)2 + 4 ε δU
2 (δU − δD)
A.2 Solution to the model with borrowing
A.2.1 Solving the agent’s problem
We assume that the solution for cas is interior. In this case the Lagrangean for any
agent a ∈ [0, 1] is
La = πaUcaU + πaDcaD + λa0
(








favM +mavMs −min{ds, vMs }ψa − cas
)
+
+ηF,ax+ ηM,am+ µa (ma −max{0, ψa})
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The rst-order optimality conditions become
λas = π
a























θψa = (fa − eF ) + p(ma − eM) (36)
cas = f
avF +mavMs −min{ds, vMs }ψa, s = U,D (37)
and complementarity slackness equations are
ηF,afa = 0, ηF,a ≥ 0, fa ≥ 0 (38)
ηM,ama = 0, ηM,a ≥ 0, ma ≥ 0 (39)
µa (ma −max{0, ψa}) = 0, µa ≥ 0, ma ≥ max{0, ψa} (40)
Using the fact that πaU + πaD = 1, then the optimality conditions are
λa0 = v
F + ηF,a (41)
pλa0 = Ea[vM ] + ηM,a + µa (42)





Ea[vM ] = πaUvMU + πaDvMD
and
Ea[min{d, vM}] = πaUmin{dU , vMU }+ πaDmin{dD, vMD }
Next, we use the same approach as in the model without borrowing.
A.2.2 General Public
In this case, we have
f g > 0, ηF,g = 0
38
and
mg = 0, ηM,g > 0.
Next, we deal with the case in which the representative members of the public buy




Then, from (43), we know that
λg0 = v








D = Eg[vM ]
implying that equations (41) and (42) writes as
pvF > Eg[vM ]
which is equal to equation (32) in the previous model, and equation (43) writes as
θvF = Eg[min{d, vM}] (44)
From equations (36) and (37), we obtain the demand for the risk-free asset
f g = eF + peM + θψg
and the consumption plan for the public becomes
cgs = f
gvF −min{ds, vMs }ψg, s = U,D.
A.2.3 Investors
For a representative investor, we have
f i = 0, ηF,i > 0
and
mi > 0, ηM,i = 0.
Then, similarly to the previous model
λi0 = v
F + ηF,i > vF
As investors sell promises since they are borrowers, we consider the case ψi > 0.
9The case ψ = 0 corresponds to the model without access to credit.
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However we have two possibilities:
1. The case ψi < mi and therefore µi = 0. In this case, the other conditions are
pλi0 = Ei[vM ]
θλi0 = Ei[min{d, vM}]
mi =
eF + peM + ψiθ
p
cis = m
ivMs −min{ds, vMs }ψi, s = U,D
2. The case ψi = mi and therefore µi > 0. In this case the other conditions are
pλi0 = Ei[vM ] + µi







vMs −min{ds, vMs }
)
, s = U,D
Then the following incentive conditions are obtained:
1. In the case ψi < mi,
pvF < Ei[vM ] (45)
θvF < Ei[min{d, vM}] (46)
which holds if and only if θEi[vM ] = pEi[min{d, vM}], i.e., when the investor
expects a return of the risky asset M equal to the return of the promise he sold.
2. In the case ψi = mi, we get a unique incentive condition
(p− θ) vF < Ei[vM ]− Ei[min{d, vM}] (47)
and
µi =
θEi[vM ]− pEi[min{d, vM}]
p− θ
which implies that this case only holds if θEi[vM ] > pEi[min{d, vM}],i.e., when
the investor expects that the return of the risky asset M will be higher than the
return of the promise he sold to the general public.10
10Note that p > θ needs to hold in this economy since that leveraged ∈ [0, 1].
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A.2.4 Existence of general equilibrium
Comparing conditions (44) for the public and (46) or (47) for the investor, it makes
sense to assume that a contract can only be drawn when the expectations for the return
of the promise for the public and investors meet each other, such that
Eg[min{d, vM}] = Ei[min{d, vM}]
Since promises are assumed to be non-contingent, i.e, dU = dD = d, if we also assume












Substituting πaD by 1 − πaU for a = g, i in the previous condition, we derive that d =
vMD , meaning that there is only equilibrium in the promises market if the payo of the
promise equals the collateral value if the worst scenario occurs, i.e., if d equals vMD . As a
consequence, equation (44) becomes
θvF = vMD (48)
which determines the equilibrium price of promise d, θ∗, meaning it equals the risk
premium at the bad state δD. In addition, the related condition for the investor (46)
becomes θvF < vMD for the case ψi < mi which cannot hold in equilibrium. Therefore,
in equilibrium, the investor will choose the case ψi = mi and equation (47) becomes
(p− θ) vF < Ei[vM ]− vMD . Using the equilibrium condition (48), then we have
pvF < Ei[vM ]
which is equal to the equation (33) in the model without borrowing.
A.2.5 The neutral agent
Because we have the same incentive conditions (32) and (33) as in the previous model
for the public and investors respectively, the incentive condition for the neutral buyer is
identical to (34):
pvF = En[vM ]
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A.2.6 Equilibrium price of the risky asset
Knowing the demand of agent a for the assets is given by (15) and (16) and that
in equilibrium, investors will choose the case where the number of promises they sell
will be equal to their holdings of M such that ψi = mi, if we run the market-clearing














nψg + (1− n)ψi = 0
By Walras’ Law, only two equations from the equilibrium conditions are independent.








A.2.7 Equilibrium participation rate
Assuming the idiosyncratic probabilities of agents are a function of a such that πas =
πs(a), for s = U,D and πnU = n and πnD = 1 − b as the the form of of the probabilities,
we can again substitute the new equilibrium asset price (18) in equation (34) in order to
get the equilibrium population split as presented in equation (20):
n∗ = n(ε, δU , δD) = −
ε+ δD −
√
(δD + ε) (4δU − 3δD + ε)
2 (δU − δD)
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B Appendix
Table V: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse Original Data
43
44
